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This model adds to thestandard neoclassical model of business ‡uctuations
by introducing a more realistic capital structure problem, where …rms have to
balance the tax bene…ts of debt with the costs of potential …nancial distress.
Therefore, …rms solve a dynamic problem with both an investment and a …-
nancing decision. This feature allows …rms to …nance investment through both
retainedearnings and debt. As a result, debt will increaseaftera positiveshock
and dividends will follow a smoother path. This implies that, as pointed by
previous empirical evidence, short-term ‡uctuations in investment are mostly
absorbedby debt and not dividends. Thecapital structuredeteriorates …rst but
then improves after a few quarters. In this model, investment is also inversely
related to …nancial leverage.
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11 Introduction
The standard real business cycle (RBC) model, as presented originally by Kydland
and Prescott [29] or Long and Plosser [31] and some of the most important exten-
sions of it, such as Hansen [24], have been quite successful in replicating some of the
main stylized facts of macroeconomic variables. It has consequently triggered a vast
literature with authors trying to extend or amend the model to account for an in-
creasing number of observed features. Nevertheless, one of the …elds where the RBC
model has not yet been able to produce a good performance is …nancial markets.
For instance, Danthine and Donaldson [13] or Jermann [25] have shown that RBC
models have a tough time in trying to replicate the equity premium that is observed
in …nancial markets. Furthermore, the standard RBC gives very few, if any at all,
indications on how variables such as dividends or debt levels vary over the cycle. One
of the possible reason for this failure mentioned by some authors is the absence of an
elaborated …nancial sector in the model. As a matter of fact, in the standard model,
…nancial markets are perfect, …rms can borrow any amount they want at a riskless
rate and default never happens. On the side of the …rm, this means that there is
no capital structure issue since the Modigliani-Miller theorem always holds. Such a
framework leaves very little room for any structured interaction to take place between
the balance sheet structure of the …rm and the real economy. Consequently, adding
a more complex …nancial sector and a more elaborated decision process for the …rm
to the model may help to account for a variety of features on …nancial markets.
The determination of the capital structure of the …rm has been at the origin of a
long and famous debate in the corporate …nance literature. It started in particular
with a famous contribution from Modigliani and Miller [35], who argue that capital
structure is irrelevant and does not a¤ect any investment decision. Major contribu-
tions afterwards have tried to contradict this point by presenting more sophisticated
models. These includes Scott [43], Kim [26] and Myers [36] or, more recently, Kim
[27], DeAngelo and Masulis [14] and Ross [41]. These models are however developed
in partial equilibrium settings and have limited ability to look at how the global
economic environment impacts the …nancial decision process of the …rm.
The objective of this paper is to try to extend the standard RBC model by incor-
porating a more realistic capital structure element as derived in the corporate …nance
literature. More particularly, one of the most popular theory that has been exposed
on the capital structure issue is the so-called ”trade-o¤” model. In this model, the
optimal capital structure is chosen by balancing the tax advantages of debt with the
costs linked to an additional unit of debt, e.g. bankruptcy costs. For the purpose
of introducing this new element, our model will incorporate two main new features.
First, in order to introduce default, we will use heterogeneity among …rms which will
be subject to both aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. The latter will determine
which …rms …nd themselves in a position not to redeem their debts and will therefore
go bankrupt. Second, …rms will be allowed to borrow from banks and use debt as
2a tax shield. With these two new elements, …rms will choose their optimal capital
structure by balancing the tax bene…t of debt with the costs linked to higher risks
of default. Hence, in this model, …rms make both an investment and a …nancing
decision. These two decisions will interact through the probability of bankruptcy. In
this case, capital structure becomes relevant and the Modigliani-Miller theorem does
not hold.
Results showthat, in this newframework, …rms will use debt to smooth dividends
over time. Investment will not be done at the expense of dividends but will rather be
…nanced by debt. This allows …rms to continue to pay dividends and simultaneously
reap the bene…ts of new investment opportunities. This is in accordance with results
found for instance by Fama and French [16] who observe that short-term ‡uctuations
ininvestment aremostly absorbedby debt. Debtin thismodel is therefore procyclical.
Dividends onthe other hand followa smoother path than the one impliedby the basic
model. Furthermore, …nancial leverage is negatively related to investment which also
seems to correspond to evidence found in Fama and French.
The models closest to ours are the one dealing with the implications from credit
market imperfections. The major contributions in this …eld include papers from
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist [4], Carlstrom and Fuerst [9] or Kiyotaki and Moore
[28]. The general objective ofthese papers is to investigate how …nancial factors in‡u-
ence the amplitude and persistence of business ‡uctuations. Tomotivate ameaningful
role of …nancial markets, these models assume that credit markets are imperfect, for
instance because there is asymetric information between borrowers and lenders. The
main feature we share with these models is the presence of a structured …nancial
sector with, in particular, the presence of risky debt for companies. However, our
model di¤ers from these contributions in the sense that it does not rely on asymetric
information to motivate the presence of a capital structure problem but rather on the
trade o¤ between a tax bene…t and costs of …nancial distress. Moreover, these models
do not incorporate the issue of the dividend policy and are therefore not suited for
looking at implications in terms of dividend ‡uctuations.
After reviewing the existing literature in the next section, the paper is then struc-
tured in two main parts, the …rst one dealing with the problem of the …rm and the
extension of the setting in a general equilibrium model. In this part, we will expose
in subsections …rst the basics of the model, then the bankruptcy process, the bank
behavior and the optimization problem of the …rm and of households. The following
section simulates the model and derives some results, comparing them in particular
with the benchmarck classical real business cycle model. Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2 Literature
Two kinds of literature are close to the topic of this paper. On one hand, we have
general equilibrium models, where some of them focus on replicating the equity pre-
3mium and others emphasize the role played by imperfections on the credit market. In
this category, we are mostly interested in papers introducing some modi…cations on
the …rm optimization problem rather than on the preference structure of households.
On the other hand, the corporate …nance literature has supplied a lot of studies about
the …rm decision process in presence of bankruptcy and in particular on the interde-
pendence of …nancing and investment decisions. These models are however developed
in a partial equilibrium setting and most of them do not deal with the implications
on the whole economy.
2.1 General equilibrium models
2.1.1 Credit market imperfections
The models closest to ours are certainly to be found in the recent literature dealing
with the e¤ect of credit market imperfections. The original contributions in this …eld
are Bernanke and Gertler [3], Greenwald and Stiglitz [23] or Gertler [20] and [21].
These models have shown in di¤erent frameworks that the presence of imperfections
on credit markets, due for instance to asymmetric information between lender and
borrower, may alter the reaction of the economy to various shocks. By focusing on
the role played by the net worth of entrepreneurs, they show that an outside shock,
beside the traditional e¤ect on productivity, also a¤ects the conditions at which …rms
are able to obtain …nance. The …nancial structure therefore adds a channel through
which shocks impact the economy. This feature has resulted in a vast literature, in
particular the whole branch dealing with the credit channel of monetary policy.
Among themostrecentcontributions, thepaperby Bernanke, GertlerandGilchrist
[4] is certainly one of the most comprehensive and representative of this literature.
Their paper illustrates a general equilibrium model in which credit market imperfec-
tions have beenendogeneized. The presence ofimperfections propagatesandampli…es
the e¤ects of both nominal and real shock, giving rise to a ”…nancial accelerator” ef-
fect. In this setting, imperfections on the credit markets arise because the presence of
asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers implies agency costs. Due to
the presence of agency costs, intermediaries will require a premium to …nance …rms.
This premium is inversely related to the net worth of entrepreneurs. In turn, changes
in net worth happen mostly through changes in the price of capital, but also through
changes in entrepreneurial income. Therefore net worth is procyclical. As a conse-
quence, a positive shock to the economy is ampli…ed because it also improves the net
worth of the …rm, thereby facilitating the possibility to obtain credit. In a …nal step,
the authors integrate this mechanism in a sticky price model and show that monetary
policy shocks are ampli…ed by the presence of credit market imperfections.
Other relevant contributions of the same type are found in Kiyotaki and Moore
[28] and Carlstrom and Fuerst [9]. Kiyotaki and Moore emphasize the role played by
changes in asset prices in the determination of credit conditions. In a model where
landis used as collateral, they showfor instance that a negative shock to the economy
4lowers the value of land and therefore the value of collateral. This is equivalent
to a tightening of credit conditions and impacts the reaction of …rms. Carlstrom
and Fuerst on the other hand uses the same type of model as Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist [4] and illustrate that it is able to generate hump-shaped responses of
output to shocks. Finally, in a series of two papers, Cooley and Quadrini [11] and
[12], highlight the distributional implications of the presence of …nancial factors. In
a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous …rms and the presence of …nancial
factors, they point to the fact that small …rms are responding more than big …rms to
shocks. In their model, monetary shocks have a persistent impact on output.
2.1.2 Asset pricing
Following the seminal contribution from Mehra and Prescott [33], which shows that
the traditional consumption based asset pricing framework is unable to replicate the
observed equity premium, several authors have tried to investigate this issue in a
general equilibrium production economy. In particular, Danthine and Donaldson [13]
have shown explicitely the reasons why the traditional model fails in replicating the
equity premium. The source of the disappointing results have to be found in the
equality between the return on physical capital and the return on the …nancial asset.
They argue that a richer modelling of the real side of the economy, as well as a more
elaborate …nancial sector have the potential to increase the equity premium. Drawing
from this conclusion, they addto the standardreal business cycle model features such
as adjustment costs of capital, …nancial leverage and risk-sharing labour contracts.
They …nd that all these characteristics, and most importantly labour contracts, lead
to a higher equity premium. Another relevant contribution in this …eld is the one
of Jermann [25]. He also starts from the basic real business cycle and adds several
re…nements in order to increase the equity premium. This paper especially integrates
habit formation preferences, which have been shown for instance by Campbell and
Cochrane [8] to impact equity prices. Jermann establishes that the combination
of preferences displaying habit formation and adjustment costs of capital helps in
explaining the equity premium. Other contributions in the same vein can be found
in Lettau [30] or in Tinguely [38].
2.2 Corporate …nance models
Our paper is also intimately linked to models of corporate …nance dealing with the
determination of the capital structure of the …rm. There is a long tradition in the
corporate…nance literature of papersinvestigatingthe problem ofthe optimal amount
of debt. The …rst and most obvious contribution was the one of Modigliani and
Miller [35], which states the famous theorem according to which the capital structure
is irrelevant in the invesment decision of the …rm. Following this seminal paper,
authors have focused on the incentives for …rms to take debt. The general academic
view for the determination of the optimal level of debt relies on a decision which
5tries to balance the tax bene…ts of debt with the costs related to leverage. Leverage
costs have included all sorts of costs, in particular costs linked to …nancial distress.
Major contribution in this area where brought by Scott [43], Kim [26] or Myers [36].
However, another famous contribution by Miller [34] showedthat an important factor
had been omitted, i.e. the tax disadvantage for households to hold corporate bonds
relative to equities. Thereafter, authors have been busy with restoring the balancing
theory through the introduction of newfeatures. Examples can be found in Kim [27],
DeAngelo and Masulis [14] or Ross [41].
More recently, papers in the same line of research, and closer to the model we
develop below, have triedto drawconclusions onthe interactionbetweenthe …nancing
and the investment decision. In particular, Dotan and Ravid [15] illustrate that
investment and optimal …nancing decisions have to be simultaneously determined.
In this case, a negative relationship exists between operating and …nancial leverage,
supporting empirical evidence on this topic. They also show that an increase in the
tax rate leads to lower investment and higher optimal leverage. The sensitivity of
investment to the …nancing decision was also emphasized by empirical papers such
as Whited [47], Bond and Meghir [5] or Wald [46]. These papers have estimated
Euler equations for investment, however augmenting them with variables linked to
the capital structure of the …rm. They …nd that those augmented Euler equations are
better able to account for the behavior of investment than the traditional neoclassical
one.
3 The model
The behavior of the …rm is the central feature di¤erentiating this model from the
classical real business cycle model. There are two main departures from the standard
model. The …rst is that …rms are allowed to default whenever they are not able
to meet their payment obligations. In the case of bankruptcy, pro…t and capital,
net of bankruptcy costs, will be seized by creditors. Of course, creditors, as well
as shareholders, might require a premium to …nance …rms which have a positive
probability of bankruptcy. Recall that in the standard model, …rms are assumed
to never default so that they are always able to meet their liabilities. To introduce
bankruptcy, we will need some heterogeneity among …rms so that only a fraction of
them default on each period. Therefore, in this economy …rms will be hit by two
kinds of shocks. The …rst one is a standard economy-wide technology shock. The
second one is a shock speci…c to each …rm, which will determine the …rms that will
default.
If the model should introduce default for …rms, then it must be the case that
…rms have outside liabilities and that conditions exist under which the …rm is not in
apositionto meet itspaymentobligations. Therefore, andthis is theseconddeparture
from the standard model, we assume that the …rm …nances its capital expenditures by
both internal and external …nance. On one hand, the …rm can use retained earnings.
6On the other hand, it might also look for outside …nance and therefore ask for loans
to banks. However, banks will require a premium to compensate for the possibility of
bankruptcy. In turn, this will impact the amount of dividends the …rm will be able
to pay to shareholders.
3.1 The basics
The economy is populated by a continuum of …rms of measure one. Firm j produces














t is the amount of capital owned by the …rm, L
j;d
t is the quantity of labour
hired by the …rm and ¸t is an aggregate productivity shock.
Earnings of the …rm, before interest and taxes (EBIT) is de…ned as the output


















where Wt is the wage rate. These earnings are then subject to corporate taxes, which
shaves a fraction ¿ of earnings. However, …rms are allowed to use debt as a tax shield
by substracting the payments linked to their debt from taxable earnings. Therefore,
pro…t will be determined as follows
¼
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where Bt¡1 stands for the amount of debt contracted by the …rm and Rt¡1 for the
gross interest rate on debt contracted in period t ¡ 1 but paid in period t. The
period subscript for debt and interest rate refers to the period in which debt was
contracted. Payment of debt plus interest rate occurs in the period following the
period of contracting.
The pro…t is then used by the …rm to pay dividends or kept as retained earning








where REt represents retained earnings and Dt dividends.
Moreover, the …rm has to determine how to …nance its investment. Contrary
to the standard model, where the …rm …nances investment only through retained
earnings, the …rm now has the possibility to borrow from a bank. Therefore, the …rm
has to make a …nancing decision, i.e. how much retained earnings and debt to use.
7For simpli…cation, we assume that the …rm does not issue new shares1. The …nancing








where It is investment in period t. Moreover, capital accumulates over time and is
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3.2 The bankruptcy process
In our setup, …rms can default. Bankruptcy happens when operational pro…t (EBIT)
is not su¢cient to pay back the debt contracted in the previous period even after
liquidating …rm’s assets. The …nal determinant of default will be the speci…c shock
hitting the …rm. We assume that the speci…c shock a¤ects the gross return on capital,


















t is a speci…c shock which is i.i.d. across time and …rms, follows a cumu-
lative distribution function G(±), a density function g (±). This type of speci…cation
for the bankruptcy process is similar to the one used by several papers on the credit
channel of monetary policy, such as Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist [4] or Carlstrom
and Fuerst [9], which assume that the speci…c shock determines the gross return on
capital. Several remarks apply nevertheless. First, the reason why the shock enters
at the EBIT level is that it allows …rms to pay wages even in the case of bankruptcy.
This assumption consents to keep consumer out of the bankruptcy issue, i.e. they
will not be a¤ected by the default of …rms. Given that the focus of this paper is
more on the implications of default for the behaviour of the …rm, we believe that this
assumption, even if simplistic, should be less relevant to the overall results2. Second,
there are several reasons to apply the shock to capital as well as to the current pe-
riod pro…t. The …rst one is more technical. As capital accumulates over time, it is
1This can be justi…ed by the observation that …rms …nance most of their investment projects
using outside …nance. Taggart (1985) indeed reports that the share of assets …nanced by new equity
issues has not exceeded 5% in the after world war II period. Moreover, as it will become clear later,
the …rms which would issue new shares are likely to be the one hit by bad shocks and therefore have
a rather unhealthy situation. Thus, this condition simply assumes that …rms with bad shocks are
prevented to access the stock market to obtain new …nancing.
2Moreover, bankruptcy laws very often give priority in the case of default to the payment of
wages, which means that workers are able to get back their salary.
8likely to be larger than the amount of debt contracted for a single period. Would
the shock a¤ect only current period operational result, then the …rm would almost
always be able to sell part of the capital to reimburse debt. The risk of default would
thus almost disappear and most likely not be able to in‡uence the decision process
of the …rm. This leads to the second reason, which relates to the di¤erence between
illiquidity and insolvency. Assume a negative speci…c shock hits only current period
pro…ts, leaving capital una¤ected. Even if pro…t is not su¢cient to pay back debt,
an arrangement could always be found to let the …rm sell part of its capital. This
case is therefore more related to the problem of illiquidity. Insolvency would arise if,
even by selling the capital, the …rm is not able to pay back debt and would thus be
forced to default. This means that the shock should also a¤ect the capital used by
the company. Finally, one could intuitively think that, when a shock hits the goods
produced by a …rm, then the value of the equipments used to produce it could also
lose some value. You would only assume that equipments are to some extent speci…c
to the production of this particular good. If, for instance, a given good becomes sud-
denly out of fashion, then the equipment would also be less useful and therefore lose
some value as it could not be reallocated easily to the production of another good.
The bankruptcy threshold for the speci…c shock is the value of ±
j
t belowwhich the
…rm’s output and residual capital are too small to pay back the wage bill and the
loan. Hence, the threshold value ¹ ±
j















































The bankruptcy threshold is increasing in the amount of debt and decreasing in the
amount of capital. The latter dependence arises from the fact that by adding capital,
the …rms extends its production possibilities and is therefore more likely to meet its
payment obligations in the following period. The probability of default will thus be a
positive function of the amount of debt and a negative function of the stock of capital
of the …rm. Thereafter, we will use the following notation for the probability that






















































The bank borrows from households and use the funds to lend to …rms. Since it
has the opportunity to make loans to a lot of di¤erent …rms, it is able to perfectly
diversify away idiosyncratic risks. Therefore it serves the risk-free rate to agents
holding bonds3. In its lending activity, it sets the interest rate so that it expects to
earn at least its opportunity cost, which in this case is the risk-free rate. The bank
will set a premium over the risk-free interest rate in order to compensate for the risk
of default of the borrower. If the …rm does not go bankrupt, the bank will receive
back in the following period the amount it has lent plus the interest rate set at the
beginning of the deal. In case of default however, the …rm will not be able to pay
back the loan. Consequently, the bank will seize what is remaining of pro…t as well
as the assets of the …rm. But the bank will also have to incur some bankruptcy costs,
which means that it will be able to obtain only a fraction µ of the total value of pro…t
and assets. Bankruptcy costs are considered here as a deadweight loss. The bank will
then go on the market with the goods seized and sell them. This amount will thus
be part of total supply, together with the goods o¤ered by companies which have not
defaulted4.











































t is the risk-free interest rate. The …rst term on the left-hand side is what
the bank gets in the case there is no default whereas the second term is the residual
value of the …rm in case of default, i.e. gross pro…t and residual capital, net of
bankruptcy costs. µ is the fraction of capital the bank receives after default, so










represents thebankruptcy costs. Theright-
hand side is the opportunity cost of the bank.
Reformulating the expression yields the following expression for the premium















































In this expression it appears that the premium is increasing in the probability of
bankruptcy. Moreover, the spread decreases with an improvement in the recovery
3This is a classical assumption made in particular in the literature dealing with credit market
imperfections (see e.g. Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist [4]).
4A full description of the equilibrium conditions will be provided at a later stage.
5We assume in this model that there is no asymetric information, i.e. the bank is perfectly able
to observe the production process and its outcome.
10ratio. Observe that if the default probability is zero, the interest rate charged to
…rms is identical to the risk-free rate. For future use, we can express the interest












































3.4 The …rm’s optimization problem
The …rm will maximise shareholder value, i.e. the present value of future cash ‡ows.
The variables over which maximisation will take place are the amount of labor and
capital and the amount of debt. Therefore, the …rm faces an investment and a
…nancing decision. In making both decisions, the …rm is however aware that it might
default at any time in the future. Should that happen, shareholders would not be
able to receive dividends anymore. Therefore, future cash ‡ows are weighted by the
probability for the …rm to stay alive. Of course, in both its investment and …nancing
decisions, the …rm will take into account that the amount of capital and debt it
chooses will impact the probability of default. Consequently, and contrary to the
standard model, real and …nancial decisions will interact, so that the irrelevance of
capital structure of Modigliani-Miller will not hold in this setup.
As it will become clear in a while, in this framework, both the investment and
the …nancing decisions are based on variables which are not dependent on the speci…c
shock. Therefore all …rms make the same decision and we can from now on drop the
superscript j. The timing of events in this economy is detailed in appendix I.










































11Kt+1 = Kt (1¡ -) + It
Rt = Rt (Bt;Kt+1)
Mt is the appropriate discount factor and will be de…ned later.
To solve the problem, we can formulate the following Lagrangian







Mt;i(qt+i(Kt+i(1 ¡ -) +It+i ¡ Kt+i+1))] (20)
which has been obtained by adding the constraint on capital accumulation through
the Lagrange multiplier qt. Moreover, by substituting for the de…nition of dividends
into the maximand, this yields the following formulation:































Mt;i(qt+i(Kt+i(1¡ -) + It+i ¡ Kt+i+1))] (21)
The …rst order conditions of this problem are as follows:




































¸t = Wt (24)
for Lt.
123.5 Implications for investment and capital structure
3.5.1 The …nancing decision
Equation (23) drives the debt policy of the …rm. For this variable, there is no com-
parison with the standard model, since in the latter …rms …nance themselves only
through retained earnings and are not allowed to take risky debt. In our setting,
the …rm chooses its optimum level of debt by balancing the tax advantages with the
costs of an additional unit of debt. The costs in this model are of two kinds. On one
hand, an additional unit of debt increases the probability of default, and therefore
the costs of …nancial distress. On the other hand, increasing …nancial leverage makes
debt more costly by increasing the interest rate charged by banks.
The advantages and costs of the …nancing decision can be seen in equation (23).
The …rst term in this equation corresponds to the proceeds of one additional unit of
debt. The second term takes into account that borrowing more increases the next
period default probability and therefore decreases the chance to receive dividend.
The third term catches the cost of borrowing, i.e. interest and principal payments,
conditional on the …rm not going bankrupt. The fourth term corresponds to the tax
advantage of taking a unit of debt. The …nal term stands for the impact of more
debt on next period contractual conditions for debt. Indeed, borrowing more today
increases tomorrow’s probability not to be able to pay back debt, lose the stock of
capital and therefore being charged a higher interest rate by creditors. This equation
thus formalizes the fact that in making its debt decision, the …rm balances the tax
advantage with the costs of …nancial distress.
The choice of the optimal level of debt can be best seen by looking at …gure 1.
This …gure shows how the value of the …rm, i.e. in our framework the present value
of future dividends, is evolving with changes in the amount of debt. One can see that
the tax bene…ts of debt are increasing with the level of debt. At very low levels of
debt, the costs are very small and thus it is pro…table for the …rm to take more debt.
However, the costs of debt are becoming increasingly important at higher levels of
debt. After a given level of debt, costs are becoming more important than the tax
advantages and the …rm has no further incentive to increase the level of debt. The
optimal level of debt is therefore achieved when the costs linked to …nancial distress
and to increasing interest rates increase quicker than the tax advantages, inducing a
decline in the value of the …rm. The optimal level of debt in the …gure is reached
at the point B¤, since from there on, the value of the …rm is decreasing in debt.
Obviously, a rise in the tax rate increases the tax bene…ts and thus is associated with
a higher optimal level of debt.
Indeed, this implication very much follows the literature in corporate …nance. In
order to explain the presence of a positive amount of debt, authors have emphasized
the role played by taxes on one side and by various costs linked to …nancial distress
on the other side. Well known contributions in this …eld include Scott (1976), Kim
(1978, 1982), DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) or Ross (1985).
13Furthermore, in our framework, the optimum level of debt is impacted by the
investment decision as well. Indeed, in this framework, the level of capital only
a¤ects the costs side of the debt decision. More capital makes the …rm’s balance
sheet more healthy and therefore decreases the costs linked to an additional unit of
debt. Therefore, an increase in capital is associated with a rise in the optimal level of
debt. In …gure 1, an increase of capital from K to K0 decreases the costs of leverage
for an equal level of debt. As the bene…ts remain una¤ected, the optimal amount of
debt rises from B¤ to B¤¤.
3.5.2 The investment decision
To study the investment decision, let’s …rst recall how the Euler equation for invest-










In equation (22), we can observe that the introduction of bankruptcy has several
implications for the invesment decision of the …rm. The …rst term corresponds to the
cost of investment and is of course identical to the classical model. The second term
is the e¤ect of one additional unit of capital on next period production. However, in
our case, the term incorporates two di¤erent features. The …rst one is about taxes
and indicates simply that a fraction of the marginal output goes to the government
in the form of corporate taxes. The second newelement re‡ects the fact that the …rm
is worried about its possible default next period and consequently not to be able to
receive the marginal product. Therefore, the marginal product is multiplied by the
probability for the …rm to be still active next period. Overall, these two e¤ects reduce
the present value of an additional unit of capital. The third term is similar to the
classical model and can be interpreted as the proceeds of liquidating the remaining
investment goods.
The following terms take into account the fact that the …rm is aware that any
change in capital will alter its …nancial position next period in two ways. The …rst
one is that adding capital today improves the production capacities of the …rm and
therefore increases the probability of receiving dividend in the next period. The
second re‡ects the fact that a change in the …nancial structure of the …rm will a¤ect
its position with respect to the bank. Adding capital makes the …rm more likely to
meet its future payment obligations, which in turn will allow the bank to charge a
lower interest rate.
Finally, we can also see that the level of debt matters in the investment decision.
An increasing level of debt makes the …rm more likely to default and therefore in-
creases the power of the default e¤ect. This shows that the separability of investment
and …nancing decisions do not apply in this setup because any change in the debt
level would change the perception of the default possibility by the …rm and therefore
14a¤ect its investment behaviour. As seen in the previous section, a rise in capital re-
sults in a higher optimal debt level. However, more debt makes …nancing more costly
for the …rm and will therefore a¤ect negatively investment.
3.6 The government
The goverment raises taxes from …rms in a way which was explicited in the previous


























, where ¿ is the tax rate on …rms which do not default.
Since the objective of this model is not to focus on the role of the government, we
assume that taxes are then rebated to households in the form of a lump-sum transfer
trt.
3.7 Households
Households in our model maximise their lifetime stream of discounted utilities. They
derive revenues from supplying labor, from investment on …nancial markets and from
government’s transfers. The proceeds are then usedto consume and save. To transfer
consumption through time, households have two kind of …nancial instruments at their
disposal. On one hand, they might buy risk-free bonds. Bonds are issued by banks
in order to collect the funds for loans to entrepreneurs. The bank is assumed to lend
money to a lot of di¤erent …rms so that the idiosyncratic risk is diversi…ed away. As
households do not incur any speci…c risk by purchasing bonds, they get the risk-free
interest rate. On the other hand, consumer might go on the equity market and buy
shares. Those shares entitle him to receive dividends from …rms. Consequently, the
























t + trt (27)
where Ls
t is the amount of labour supplied by the household, Wt is the wage rate,
BH
t is the amount of risk-free bonds, Zt the quantity of equities, Qt the price of the
equity, Dt the dividend distributed by …rms and trt transfers from the government.
Here we have assumed that households hold a portfolio of shares which entitle them
to the aggregate ‡ow of dividends. This could have also been done by introducing
mutual funds and assuming that households own shares of these funds, which in turn
hold a diversi…ed portfolio of all existing …rms.































































We are now able to de…ne the appropriate discount factor which has been used
in the …rm’s problem. Mt re‡ects the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in











To de…ne what the equilibrium of this economy will be, we …rst have to determine
what aggregate values are. This should take into account that a proportion of …rms
will default in each period and will therefore not pay dividend. The law of large





For dividends and investment, aggregate value correspond to dividends paid and















16where the superscript A stands for aggregate values. As far as aggregate output
is concerned, one must take into account that a fraction of production is lost as a
bankruptcy costs. The output of …rms which default is seized by banks which have to
incur a bankruptcy cost which is a fraction 1¡ µ of the output seized. As these costs
are considered as a deadweight loss, they must be deducted from total production.
Y A
t = Yt ¡ (1¡ µ)
Z ¹ ±t
0
(Yt ¡ WtLt)dG(±) (35)
In terms of capital accumulated, the aggregate stock of capital is the depreciated









(Kt (1¡ -))dG(±) (36)
Moreover, we need equilibrium conditions on the goods market as well as on the
bond and equity markets. Concerning the goods market, total supply includes aggre-
gate output, i.e. total production excluded the fraction of output lost in bankruptcy
costs. However, banks seizes the assets of defaulted …rms and sell them on the goods
market. Therefore total aggregate supply also includes a fraction µ of the assets of
…rms which have gone bankrupt. Demand includes aggregate investment and con-






µ(Kt(1¡ -))dG(±) = I
A
t + Ct (37)
Zt = 1 (38)
BH
t = Bt (39)
LD
t = LS
t = Lt (40)
Equilibrium can …nally be de…ned as a series of wages and share prices such that
…rm’s …rst order conditions (22), (23), (24) and consumer …rst order conditions (28),
(29) and (30) are satis…ed, together with market clearing conditions (37) to (40).
4 Calibration
4.1 Functional forms
Functional forms chosen for the evaluation of the model largely follow the bench-







where ® is the share of capital and ¸t is the aggregate productivity shock.
17Preferences are represented by the utility function of the form
u(Ct;1 ¡ Lt) = logCt ¡ ALt (42)
where the linearity in the labor variable is derived from indivisibilities in the labor
choice used in Hansen’s model.
Finally, the aggregate productivity shock ¸t is assumed to follow a …rst order
autoregressive process in logs
log¸t = Ãlog¸t¡1 + ²t (43)
where ²t is a random variable distributed according to an i.i.d. normal distribution
with mean zero and variance ¾2
².
4.2 Parameters
We select very standard values for the preference and technology parameters, mostly
following observed business cycle characteristics referenced in Cooley and Prescott
[10]. In our model, a period corresponds to a quarter. In particular, we choose stan-
dard parameters so as to match a capital over output ratio of 3:32 and an investment
over capital ratio of 0:076. This results in a quarterly discount rate ¯ of 0:99 (corre-
sponding ot real interest rate of one percent per quarter). The capital share ® is set
to 0:35 and the household labor share is thus the complementary 0:65. The quarterly
depreciation rate of capital - is assigned the usual value of 0:019.
Remaining are the parameters which are non standard, i.e. those linked with
the …nancing decision of the …rm. Here, we mostly follow much of the literature on
credit market imperfections, such as Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist [4], Fisher [17]
or Carlstrom and Fuerst [9]. The parameters are set so as to match the following
steady-state outcomes: (1) a spread between risk-free interest rate and the interest
rate charged by the bank of 200 basis points, approximately consistent with the
historical average spread between the prime lending rate and the six-month Treasury
bill rate; (2) an annualized default rate of 3 percent; (3) a debt over capital ratio
of 0:5. Concerning this last variable, Taggart [37] has reported values about the
fraction of assets …nanced through debt in the after war period varying between 30%
and 47%. Therefore, in order to make results as robust as possible, we implement the
simulations for a leverage ratio of 0:3 as well. For a leverage ratio of 50%, the tax
rate will be close to 20%, which is approximately consistent with estimates given by
Taggart [37]. The recovery ratio is 78% for a debt over capital ratio of 0:5 and 92%
for a ratio of 0:3, which is roughly in line with the values mentioned by Carlstrom
and Fuerst [9] and the studies quoted in their paper. Finally, the speci…c shock is
distributed uniformly on an interval determined by ". This parameter takes a value
of 0:75 for a debt over capital ratio of 0:3 and a value of 0:53 for a ratio of 0:5. The
parameters of the model are summarized in table 1.
184.3 Approximation method
To solve the model, we use the method of undetermined coe¢cients explicited in
Campbell [6] and Uhlig [44]. This method implies a log-linear approximation of the
system around the steady state.
5 Results
The model will be evaluated by computing both the moments of the main variables
and impulse response functions to an aggregate productivity shock. As a benchmark
model, we use the model of indivisible labor put forth by Hansen [24]. The model is
however slightly modi…ed to incorporate the payment of dividends from …rms. We
de…ne dividends in the basic model as the residual pro…t after the investment decision








t ¡ It (44)
In this sense, we follow authors such as Danthine and Donaldson [13], Jermann [25]
or Rouwenhorst [42]. Therefore, and when possible, results will be compared to
the moments derived from the benchmark model and to the observed moments of
the US economy. The later are taken mostly from Hansen [24] where they have been
computed using quarterly datadetrended witha Hodrick-Prescott …lter. Statistics for
dividends and debt have been computed by ourselves using quarterly data available
from US NIPA statistics for dividends and from the US Flow of Funds statistics
for debt6. The statistics computed from the various versions of the models are also
detrended using a Hodrick-Prescott …lter. To evaluate the impulse response functions
ofthemodel, we alsoestimatefromthedataa VARframeworkwiththemain variables
of the model and derive the empirical impulse response to a 1% technology shock.
The VAR usedis a very basic one includingreal GDP, in‡ation, commodities in‡ation
and real fed funds rate. The variable for which we want to investigate the reaction
is always added at the …rst place in the ordering. This results in a 5 variables VAR
estimatedwithquarterly observationsonthe period1955-2001. Theempirical impulse
responses are reported in …gure 8.
The …rst thing we are interested in is the behavior of debt in the model and,
by the same token, of the leverage ratio. Figure 2 shows the response of debt to a
one percent positive productivity shock. There we can see that, as expected, debt
is increasing after a positive shock. This happens because a positive shock leads to
more investment and therefore more capital. But, as mentioned previously, a rise
in capital leads to an increase in the optimal level of debt, through a decrease of
…nancial and default costs linked to debt. The reaction of debt in our model is very
similar to the one identi…ed by the empirical VAR. One can see on …gure 8 how close
6For debt, we have selected the L. 101 category on the level of total non-…nancial business loans
from the US Flow of Funds statistics.
19the reaction of the arti…cial and the empirical measure of debt are. The procyclical
nature of debt is also observable through the simulated moments of the economy, i.e.
variance and correlation with output. These …gures are reported in table 2, together
with the observed moments of the US economy and those of the benchmark model.
There we see that the correlation of debt with output is positive and highly signi…cant
and that the variance of debt is around 20% that of output. In the US economy, debt
is indeed positively correlated with output, but the coe¢cient is not that important.
Moreover, the variance of debt is rather high, roughly three times that of output, i.e.
in between that of investment and the one of consumption. Consequently, our model
is doing a good job in replicating qualitative aspect of the behavior of debt but still
needs improvement as far as the quantitative side is concerned.
An increase in debt also means that the …rm is using external funds to …nance
its investment plans. In the standard RBC model, the …rm have no access to outside
…nance and is forced to fund investment through retained earnings. As a result,
dividends are strongly countercyclical in the standard model because they absorb
all the short-term ‡uctuations of investment. Indeed, when looking at the impulse
responses in …gure 3, one can note that the reaction of dividends in the standard
model is almost the mirror image of that of investment. In our model, the …rm is
allowed to use both retained earnings and debt to …nance investment. A rise in debt
implies that the …rm does not need to lower dividends as much as in the standard
model in order to obtain funds for investment. The impact of the addition of debt in
the model on the behavior of dividends can be observed in …gure 3. There we note
that dividends are nowmuchless countercyclical than they are inthe standard model.
In other terms, the use of debt allows …rms to smooth dividends over time. In the
standard model, …rms would have to forego very pro…table investment opportunities
in order to be able to achieve a smoother dividend path. This seems to bode well with
evidence described by Fama and French [16], who show empirically that short-term
‡uctuations in investment are absorbed mainly by debt, whereas dividends remain
relatively sticky. These changes in the shape of the reaction of dividends are also
striking from the simulated moments in table 2. Whereas in the standard model the
variance of dividends is four times higher than the one of output, in the model with a
leverage ratio of 50%, the variance of dividends becomes lower than the one of output.
Furthermore, the correlation with output moves from ¡0:98 to ¡0:74. On this later
front however, the model is not yet achieving a satisfactory result. It has been shown
by Campbell [7], Fama and French [16] or Gertler and Hubbard [22] that dividends
are positively correlated with economic activity. In table 2, we have computed that
the correlation of dividends with output is 0:34. One can also observe in …gure 8 that
dividends react positively to a technology shock. Consequently, whereas our model
is able to reproduce a smoother path for dividends, it is still not able to reproduce
the positive correlation with economic activity.
The corollary of this evolution is that investment in this model still has a positive
reaction to a favorable productivity shock, but the amplitude of the reaction is de-
20creased. This happens because investment is now …nanced partly by outside …nance.
But this type of funds is more costly than internal funds, both in terms of increase in
the probability of default and in terms of interest rates. In table 2, we see that the
reaction of investment is not as strong anymore as in the standard model. Moreover,
…gure 4 shows that the reaction is dampened when the leverage ratio is increased.
The higher the leverage ratio, the higher the cost of obtaining outside …nance and
therefore the lower the reaction of investment. This result is consistent with observa-
tions andimplications from the corporate …nance literature. In particular, Dotan and
Ravid [15] emphasize that in a same type of model, however in partial equilibrium,
operating and …nancial leverage are inversely related. They claim that this results
is consistent with empirical observations. Moreover, Fama and French [16] have also
reported that leverage was negatively related to investment opporturtinities. As a
further consequence, output in our framework is slightly less volatile than in the
benchmark model (…gure 5).
This implication is partly surprising when looking at some of the literature on
credit market imperfections. For instance, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist [4] …nd
that the introduction of imperfections on the credit market ampli…es output ‡uctua-
tions. This implicationis indeed at theheart ofthe theory ofthe …nancial accelerator.
However, …rms in their model do not solve for an optimal level of debt and do not
distribute dividends. Indeed, the amount borrowed depends on the evolution of net
worth of entrepreneurs. Pro…ts increase net worth and are entirely kept to …nance
future investment plans. Since net worth is improved during expansions, …rms are
able to obtain …nance at more favorable conditions and therefore expand investment.
However, what we show is that, as soon as we allow …rms to pay dividends, entrepre-
neurs will prefer to rely more on external …nance and pay positive dividends. Since
this kind of …nance is more costly, investment is lowered. Therefore, the two models
highlight two di¤erent mechanisms, which are likely to be complementary.
The next question is what happens to the structure of capital. Figures 6 and 7
give us some hints by illustrating the reaction of both debt and capital to a positive
productivity shock. In the short term, the …rm relies heavily on external …nance to
fund investment and therefore the increase in debt is stronger than the rise of capital.
Thus, the debt over capital ratio worsens in the immediate quarters following the
shock. Nevertheless, after a while, investment becomes productive and generates
pro…ts. In turn, this allows …rms to …nance part of investment through retained
earnings and thus debt is decreasing faster than capital. Some time after the shock,
the capital structure starts to improve de…nitely. Since when the leverage ratio is
higher the reaction of debt is smaller, the capital structure improves quicker with
a leverage ratio of 50% than with one of 30%. With a leverage ratio of 50%, the
structure of capital deteriorates in the …rst year only and then starts to improve from
the second year onward.
216 Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to look at the implications of the introduction in a
standard RBC model of a more sophisticated decision process on the side of the …rm.
Our model nests a traditional real business cycle model with a classical contribution
from the corporate …nance …eld. The later argues that in order to determine the
optimal capital structure, …rms balance the tax bene…t of debt with the costs linked
to …nancial distress. In our model, …rms can go bankrupt because they might su¤er
from a su¢ciently negative shock so that they will be unable to meet their payment
obligations. In order to allow for default, we have introduced the possibility for the
…rm to borrow funds from banks. Moreover, the model also introduces taxes as a
major determinant of the capital structure decision. Therefore, in this setup, …rms
have to solve simultaneously for an investment and a …nancing decision. In the later
decision, the …rm will have to determine how much retained earnings and how much
external funds it will use in order to …nance the desired investment plans. In making
both decisions, …rms are aware that they might default at any point in time in the
future and lose their future dividend stream. As a result, both decisions will interact
and the Modigliani-Miller theorem does not apply in this framework.
Among the main contributions of this paper, we have shown that the introduction
ofa more elaboratedcapital structureproblem allows fora positive correlationof debt
withoutputandamuchsmootherpathfordividendsthanit is thecase inthestandard
RBC model. Indeed, …rms will use in part debt to …nance new investment plans in
order to be able to keep acertainlevel ofdividends. In thestandardRBC model, since
only internal funds areused, dividendstendto vary ina mirror imagewithinvestment.
Therefore, and consistent with empirical evidence, ‡uctuations in investment are
mostly absorbed by debt and not by dividends. Moreover, since outside …nance is
more costly than internal …nance, investment tend to react less in our model than in
a standard model. As a matter of fact, the higher the leverage ratio, the more muted
the reaction of investment, and therefore capital and output, is. This con…rms that
an economy in which the balance sheet conditions are more vulnerable, …rms will
be less able to reap the full bene…ts of new investment opportunities. Furthermore,
this is in accordance with results where it has been shown that leverage is negatively
related to investment opportunities.
In further research, the model might be used to study a variety of problems. One
possible extension would be to look at the impact of a smoother path of dividends
on asset prices. Indeed, a less countercyclical path of dividends would make equities
less valuable for households. In this sense, it might add to the equity premium.
Another directionthat might be investigated is thee¤ect ofmonetary policy andmore
particularly the hypothesis of the presence of a …nancial accelerator e¤ect. Overall,
we believe that the model shows that adding a more sophisticated…rm problem tothe
standard RBC model might allow to investigate a variety of issues on the interaction
between corporate …nance decisions and general economic conditions.
227 Appendix
Timing issues : this is the sequence of events in a given period t
Bt¡1, Kt, Rt¡1 are inherited from previous period
1. Aggregate shock is realized : ¸t
2. Firms decide on labor input : LD
t
3. Households supply labor : LS
t
4. Bankruptcy threshold ¹ ±t is determined
5. Speci…c shock is realized : ±t. Production takes place
(a) Firms for which ±t · ¹ ±t default : WtLt of goods are kept by the …rm to pay
wages. The rest of the production and assets Kt are seized by the bank.
Firms stop activity
(b) Firms for which ±t ¸ ¹ ±t continue.
6. Labor and good markets clear. Supply of goods is the production ofnon default
…rms plus goods of default …rms seized by the bank less bankruptcy costs :
Yt ¡ (1 ¡µ)
Z ¹ ±t
0
[Yt ¡ WtLt + Kt (1¡ -)]dG(±)
7. Firms pay back debt plus interest contracted in the previous period Bt¡1Rt¡1.
Pro…t is determined.
8. Investment and …nancing decisions are made simultaneously, …rms decide on
next period capital and amount of debt: It, Kt+1, Bt
9. The bank de…nes the interest rate charged on the basis of the amount of debt
contracted and the next period quantity of capital : Rt. Firms get money for
new contracted loan Bt
10. Dividends are paid : Dt
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Table 1: Value of the parameters of the model
US data Basic RBC With debt With debt
B/K=0.3 B/K=0.5
(a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c)
capital 0.63 0.36 0.04 0.45 0.24 0.32 0.37 0.22 0.35 0.32 0.20 0.36
debt 4.82 2.78 0.29 0.43 0.25 0.94 0.28 0.18 0.81
consumption 1.29 0.73 0.85 0.48 0.26 0.87 0.58 0.34 0.91 0.63 0.40 0.93
output 1.76 1.00 1.00 1.88 1.00 1.00 1.69 1.00 1.00 1.59 1.00 1.00
labor 1.66 0.94 0.76 1.48 0.79 0.99 1.20 0.71 0.98 1.03 0.65 0.97
investment 8.60 4.89 0.92 6.85 3.64 0.99 5.71 3.38 0.99 5.04 3.17 0.99
dividends 3.73 2.14 0.34 7.62 4.05 -0.98 2.06 1.22 -0.73 1.20 0.75 -0.74
Table 2: Summary statistics for US economy, benchmark model and present model.
Data for the US economy are taken from Hansen (1985) for standard variables and
computed by the author for debt and dividends. The benchmark model is the one of
Hansen (1985) slightly modi…ed to incorporate dividends. Column (a) is the variance
of the variable, column (b) is the variance of the variable relative to the variance of
output and column (c) is the correlation with output
28B* B**
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Value with capital K
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Tax benefit with K’
Figure 1: The value of the …rm and the optimal level of debt.





























































Figure 2: Response of debt to a one percent positive technology shock.


































































Figure 3: Response of dividends to a one percent positive technology shock.
































































Figure 4: Response of investment to a one percent positive technology shock.









































































Figure 5: Response of output to a one percent positive technology shock.




































































Figure 6: Response of debt and capital to a one percent positive technology shock
with a leverage ratio of 30%.





































































Figure 7: Response of debt and capital to a one percent positive technology shock
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Response of consumption to One S.D. output shock
Figure 8: Empirical impulse-responses to output shock. All IRF are derived from a 5
variables VAR including the variable in plot in addition to real GDP (in % deviation
from HP trend), in‡ation rate, commodities in‡ation rate and interest rate on fed
funds. System is estimated on the 1955-2001 period with quarterly observations.
36